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Recent brain imaging research revealed that internally guided actions involve the frontomedian 
wall, in particular the preSMA and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ). However, a systematic 
decomposition of different components of intentional action is still lacking. We propose a new 
paradigm to dissociate two components of internally guided behavior: Which action to perform 
(selection component) and when to perform the action (timing component). Our results suggest 
a neuro-functional dissociation of intentional action timing and intentional action selection. While 
the RCZ is more strongly activated for the selection component, a part of the superior medial 
frontal gyrus is more strongly activated for the timing component. However, in a post hoc 
conducted signal strength analysis we did also observe an interaction between action timing 
and action selection, indicating that decisional processes concerning action timing and action 
selection are not completely dissociated but interdependent. Altogether this study challenges 
the idea of a unitary system supporting voluntary action and instead suggests the existence 
of different neuroanatomically dissociable subfunctions.
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voluntary action control are not only in charge of the prediction of 
the sensory consequences of the action (see Blakemore et al., 1998) 
and of the conscious experience of intending to act (see Haggard 
and Clarke, 2003), they also have to take care of a series of deci-
sions regarding whether to act (see Brass and Haggard, 2007), what 
action to perform and when to perform it. It is at present unclear 
how precisely these different cognitive antecedents of voluntary 
actions are controlled in the brain.
The present study is meant to ﬁ  ll one of the gaps in our current 
knowledge of the neurophysiological substrate of voluntary action 
control. To be precise, we aimed at providing further insights into 
the role of frontomesial cortical regions in two different decision 
processes that are basic for carrying out a voluntary action: When 
people perform voluntary actions, they do not only have to choose 
which action to perform, they also have to determine an appropriate 
point in time to perform it. Imagine a soccer player approaching 
the goal. He has to decide whether to pass the ball or to shoot on 
the goal. He also has to choose the right moment to act. Thus, there 
are at least two components of internally guided actions: ‘what’ and 
‘when’ (see Mueller et al., 2007). In the following we label actions 
referring to the ‘when-component’ internally or externally timed, 
whereas we label actions referring to the ‘what-component’ inter-
nally or externally selected.
Usually studies on voluntary action investigate one or the other 
component of voluntary action control. A direct comparison of 
both components within one paradigm has never been carried 
out. Typically, in studies exploring internal action timing, a condi-
tion in which subjects self-initiate a key press is compared with a 
condition in which subjects respond to a visual or acoustic cue (c.f. 
Deiber et al., 1999). As a correlate of internal action timing those 
studies reported activation in the preSMA and/or cingulate motor 
INTRODUCTION
Human actions exist along a continuum with regard to whether 
they are externally or internally controlled. In every day life, actions 
rarely correspond to the extremes of the continuum. Nevertheless, 
they can be classiﬁ  ed into actions guided foremost by internal fac-
tors, for example switching on TV to watch the news, and actions 
guided rather by environmental stimuli, for example stopping in 
front of a red trafﬁ  c light.
The two types of actions differ in functional terms and in the 
neurophysiological substrate that controls the actions. Herwig et al. 
(2007) suggest that, in the stimulus-based mode, the agent passes 
on control to the environment in that the system merely acts upon 
presentation of a particular stimulus in a prespeciﬁ  ed way (pre-
pared reﬂ  ex, see Hommel, 2000). These actions are selected with 
respect to their sensory antecedents. By contrast, in the intention-
based mode actions are guided by the ideomotor principle, that is, 
they are selected with respect to the intended sensory consequences 
(e.g., Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1997). Regarding the underlying neu-
roanatomical differences between the two action modes (Goldberg, 
1985) emphasized the distinction between a medial and a lateral 
motor system which are involved in internally and externally guided 
actions, respectively.
As concerns voluntary actions, fMRI studies show that several 
areas in the frontomesial cortex including the preSMA and the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) play a major role in the internal 
selection and timing of action, as well as in related functions like 
the inhibition of competing action alternatives and the evalua-
tion of likely outcomes and rewards of actions (e.g., Cunnington 
et al., 2002, 2005; Lau et al., 2004a,b, 2006; Rushworth et al., 2004). 
However, performing a voluntary action necessitates a large amount 
of information to be generated and processed. The areas involved in 
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areas (Cunnington et al., 2002; Debaere et al., 2003; Deiber et al., 
1999; Jahanshahi et al., 1995; Jenkins et al., 2000; Wiese et al., 2004). 
Similar activations were found in studies exploring the internal 
selection of actions (Cunnington et al., 2006; Lau et al., 2006; van 
Eimeren et al., 2006). van Eimeren et al. (2006), for example com-
pared a full-selection condition in which subjects could freely select 
which one out of four buttons to press with different restricted 
conditions (two or three response possibilities) as well as with 
a full restricted condition (forced choice). The most prominent 
activation they found as a correlate for internal action selection 
was located in the ACC, and the preSMA. Taken together there 
seems to be no evidence for a speciﬁ  c activation related to the 
selection or timing component of intentional action. This ﬁ  nding 
is in line with the conclusion (Jahanshahi and Frith, 1998) drew 
from a review of several neuroimaging studies: They found sev-
eral cortical (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ACC and SMA) and 
subcortical structures (thalamus and basal ganglia) to be involved 
in the control of voluntary actions regardless of whether they are 
internally selected, timed or inhibited and proposed the existence 
of a uniform ‘willed action system’.
However, contrary to this notion, Mueller et al. (2007) provided 
evidence for a dissociation of the ‘what-’ and the ‘when-component’ 
of intentional action, using a paradigm introduced by Waszak et al. 
(2005). In this paradigm, subjects performed a temporal bisection 
task, making left or right key presses at the midpoint between iso-
chronous pacing signals (a sequence of ‘X’s presented to the left or 
the right of the ﬁ  xation cross). In the internally selected condition 
the subjects’ key press determined the location of the subsequent 
‘X’ on the screen. In this condition, subjects were instructed to 
generate a random sequence of left and right ‘X’s. In the externally 
selected condition, by contrast, the subjects’ key press was prompted 
by the location of the preceding stimulus. The movements in a 
given externally selected run were yoked (in a disguised fashion) to 
the movements produced in the preceding internally selected run. 
The results of the study by Mueller et al. (2007) revealed that the 
rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) but not the preSMA was related to 
internal action selection. Mueller and colleagues speculated that the 
preSMA might be more closely linked to the internal action timing. 
However, a direct comparison of both components – necessary to 
demonstrate a dissociation between the two aspects of action con-
trol within the frontomedian wall – has never been carried out.
In the present study we directly tested for a functional dissocia-
tion of ‘when-’ and ‘what-component’ within regions of the fron-
tomedian wall. To do so, we independently manipulated these two 
components of voluntary action control within one task. Subjects 
were instructed to decide as fast as possible after presentation of 
a cue which action to perform, and when. The two decisions were 
either taken by the participants (internal) or based on the cue 
(external), enabling us to differentiate between internal and external 
‘when’ and ‘what’ decisions. Based on the ﬁ  ndings of Mueller et al. 
(2007), we expected to ﬁ  nd increased activation in the RCZ for 
internally selected actions and increased activation in the preSMA 
for internally timed actions. In this previous study we could show a 
similar network of activations for internally and externally selected 
actions, but to a stronger degree for internally selected actions. 
From this result we concluded that externally guided actions are 
generally less complex than internally guided actions. Therefore we 
did not expect to ﬁ  nd activation differences for the main effects 
of the reversed contrasts (externally selected and externally timed 
actions respectively).
While the primary goal of our study was to investigate brain 
areas that are involved in the decision processes that occur in the 
cue phase, we tested whether frontomedian activation was also 
related to the implementation of the action. In our paradigm the 
moment when the subjects have to make the decision what to do, 
and when, and the moment when the subjects actually have to 
execute the action were experimentally dissociated. Subjects were 
instructed to decide as fast as possible after cue presentation which 
action to perform, and when. However, it is only after a variable cue-
target-interval (CTI) that they were required to perform the action, 
enabling us to separate cue and target BOLD-response (reﬂ  ecting 
decisional processes and processes related to the implementation 
of the action, respectively).
We assumed that activation differences in the frontomedian wall 
reﬂ  ect mainly decisional aspects of voluntary action control. Since 
we were especially interested in these ‘what’ and ‘when’ decisions, 
the fMRI analysis focused on activations upon cue presentation. 
By contrast, we presumed that the implementation of the decision 
should not differentially involve frontomedian brain regions. Thus 
we hypothesized to ﬁ  nd no activation differences contingent on 
the target in the frontomedian wall. The data of the target period 
are also presented below.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Sixteen healthy subjects (eight females) with a mean age of 25.44 
years (SD ± 2.87) with normal or corrected to normal vision par-
ticipated in the study. Two subjects were excluded from the analysis 
because they were not able to synchronize key presses with the 
pacing signals. Hence, 14 subjects remained (6 females). All sub-
jects were right-handed as indicated by scores on the Edinburgh 
Handedness Inventory (Oldﬁ  eld,  1971). Subjects gave written 
informed consent to the study. All subjects had extensive expe-
rience with participating in fMRI studies and had no history of 
psychiatric, major medical, or neurological disorder.
TASK
The sequence of events in one trial was as follows (see Figure 1). 
At the beginning of each trial subjects were presented with a cue 
consisting of two letters. After a variable CTI (jittered in a pseudo-
logarithmic order in steps of 400 ms from 200 to 10400 ms), during 
which subjects viewed a ﬁ  xation cross at the center of the screen, 
four tones (duration = 100 ms) were presented at a constant inter-
val of 1000 ms. The rationale behind the intense jittering of the CTI 
was to separate cue-related activation from target-related activa-
tion. This separation was critical to the present study as we wanted 
to look at processes underlying action planning rather than action 
execution. Furthermore it is important to note that we introduced 
four target tones rather than two target tones to assure that sub-
jects could prepare the two possible action times equally well. This 
manipulation also guarantees that subjects responded with the tone 
rather than reacted on the tone as they were able to anticipate 
the appearance of the target tone. The task of the subject was to 
perform a left or a right key press on the third or the fourth tone. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February  2009 | Volume  3 | Article  3 | 3
Krieghoff et al.  What and when of intentional actions
The ﬁ  rst letter of the cue informed the subject about the ‘what-
decision’: it indicated either that the subject was to freely choose 
between left and right (W), or it indicated which key to press [L or 
R (left/right in German)]. That is the ﬁ  rst letter indicated either an 
internal ‘what-decision’ or an external ‘what-decision’. The second 
letter of the cue informed the subject about the ‘when-decision’: it 
indicated either that the subject was to freely choose between the 
third and the fourth key press (X), or it indicated the tone on which 
the subject had to press the key [D or V (third/fourth in German)]. 
That is the second letter indicated either an internal ‘when-decision’ 
or an externally cued ‘when-decision’. Subjects were instructed to 
decide as fast as possible after the cue presentation which action 
to perform, and when.
Both factors [‘what’ (externally vs. internally) and ‘when’ (exter-
nally vs. internally)] were independently crossed, resulting in four 
action conditions: both parameters internal (entirely internal 
condition), ‘what’ internal and ‘when’ external (internal selection 
condition), ‘what’ external and ‘when’ internal (internal timing con-
dition), and ‘what’ and ‘when’ external (entirely external condition): 
After the tones there was a variable inter-trial-interval (ITI) that 
was jittered in steps of 500 ms from 2000 to 6000 ms. Due to the 
intense jittering the total trial length varied between 6600 ms (for 
the shortest trial) and 20800 ms (for the longest trial).
We conducted an event-related-design and stimuli were pre-
sented in randomized order. For each of the four conditions there 
were 36 trials; the whole experiment lasted about 30 min. Prior to 
the scanning session subjects underwent a training session outside 
the scanner to become familiar with the paradigm. The proce-
dure was identical to the main session with the exception that we 
introduced feedback after the button press. Subjects then started 
the next trial themselves to give them time to ask questions if they 
had some. The training phase lasted about 5 min.
STIMULI
The stimuli used as the cue consisted of six letters (L, R, D, V, W, X; 
see above). The letters were presented in pairs of two in the center 
of the screen. They were presented in white on a black background. 
The auditory pacing signals were sine tones (600 Hz; 100 ms in 
duration) presented at a constant interval of 1000 ms after the CTI 
at a loudness level of 80 dBA. Stimulus presentation, synchroniza-
tion of stimulus presentation, image pulse acquisition and record-
ings of motor responses was carried out with the software package 
Presentation (http://www.neurobs.com).
MRI SCANNING PROCEDURE
The experiment was carried out on a 3T scanner (Siemens, Erlangen, 
Germany). Twenty-four axial slices were acquired (19.2 cm ﬁ  eld 
of view, 64 × 64 matrix, 4 mm thickness, 25% gap) parallel to 
the AC–PC-axis and covering the whole-brain. Slice gaps were 
interpolated to generate output data with a spatial resolution of 
3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm. A single shot, gradient recalled echo planar 
imaging (EPI) sequence was used (repetition time 2000 ms, echo 
time 30 ms, 90° ﬂ  ip-angle, acquisition bandwidth 100 kHz). Prior 
to functional runs corresponding 24 anatomical MDEFT slices and 
24 EPI-T1 slices were acquired with the same geometrical param-
eters (slices, resolution) and the same bandwidth as used for the 
fMRI data. Stimuli were displayed by an LCD projector on a back-
projection screen mounted in the bore of the magnet behind the 
participants’ head.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Data processing was performed using the software package LIPSIA 
(Lohmann et al., 2001). This software package contains tools for 
pre-processing, co-registration, statistical evaluation, and visuali-
zation of fMRI data. First, functional data were motion-corrected 
ofﬂ  ine with the Siemens motion correction protocol (Siemens, 
Erlangen, Germany). Then, a sinc-interpolation algorithm was 
applied to correct for the temporal offset between the slices acquired 
in one scan. Data were ﬁ  ltered with a spatial Gaussian ﬁ  lter with 
5.65 mm (σ = 0.8) full width at half maximum (FWHM). A tem-
poral high-pass ﬁ  lter of 90 s was used for baseline correction of 
the signal. All functional data sets were individually registered 
into 3-D space using participant’s individual high-resolution ana-
tomical images. This 3-D reference data set was acquired for each 
FIGURE 1 | Paradigm. Experimental design. Sequence of events in one trial. 
For details see text. First, subjects are presented with a cue indicating an 
internal or an external what (left or right key press) or when decision (third or 
fourth tone). In the example subjects could freely select which button to press, 
and when. After a variable CTI (jittered in a pseudo-logarithmic order in steps of 
400 ms from 200 to 10400 ms), during which subjects viewed a ﬁ  xation cross at 
the center of the screen, four tones (duration = 100 ms) were presented at a 
constant interval of 1000 ms. The subjects had to press the appropriate button in 
synchrony with the appropriate tone. After the tones there was a variable inter-
trial-interval (ITI) that was jittered in steps of 500 ms from 2000 to 6000 ms.Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February  2009 | Volume  3 | Article  3 | 4
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 participant during a previous scanning session. The 2-D anatomical 
MDFET slices, geometrically aligned with the functional slices, were 
used to compute a transformation matrix containing rotational and 
translational parameter, which register the anatomical slices with 
the 3-D reference T1 data set. These transformation matrices were 
normalized to the standard Talairach stereotactic space (Talairach 
and Tournoux, 1988) by linear scaling and ﬁ  nally applied to the 
individual functional data. The statistical evaluation was based on 
a least-squares estimation using the general linear model for seri-
ally autocorrelated observations (Friston et al., 1995; Worsley and 
Friston, 1995). The design matrix for event-related analysis was 
created using a model of the hemodynamic response with a variable 
delay. Brain activations were analyzed in an event-related design. 
The four experimental conditions were modeled for cue and target 
as separate regressors with the trigger set on the appearance of the 
cue and the button press respectively (duration of analyzed events: 
1000 ms). Furthermore CTI and ITI were also modeled as separate 
regressors with the trigger set on the start of the CTI and ITI. Here 
the duration of the events was identical with the respective CTI and 
ITI duration. Only correct trials, that is, trials with correct button 
press (L/R) and action times [time of key press (ms) before or after 
onset of the tone] within the time window between 250 ms before 
and 250 ms after the tone were retained for further analysis. The 
model equation, including the observation data, the design matrix 
and the error term, was convolved with a Gaussian kernel with a 
dispersion of 4-s FWHM to account for the temporal autocorrela-
tion (Worsley and Friston, 1995). Contrast maps were generated 
for each participant. As the individual functional datasets were all 
aligned to the same stereotactic reference space, a group analysis was 
then performed. A one-sample T-test of contrast maps across par-
ticipants (random effects model) was computed to indicate whether 
observed differences between conditions were signiﬁ  cantly different 
from 0. Subsequently, T-values were transformed into z-scores. 
Results were corrected for multiple comparisons using a combina-
tion of individual voxel probability thresholding and minimum 
cluster size thresholding (Forman et al., 1995; Xiong et al., 1995). 
Given an original signiﬁ  cance threshold of z = 3.09 (uncorrected), 
1000 iterations of Monte Carlo simulations were used to conﬁ  rm 
that the true false-positive probability of p = 0.001 corresponds to 
a minimum cluster size of 1134.00 mm3.
For the signal strength analysis we deﬁ  ned a mask around each 
region with a radius of 9 mm. Within each subject and region 
(Voxel) a mean contrast was calculated separately for each condi-
tion. The mean values of the regions subsequently entered SPSS 
for further analysis as described in the results part.
ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL DATA
As for the fMRI analysis, only correct trials were retained for fur-
ther analysis. To test for differences between conditions we ran a 
repeated measures ANOVA with factor condition. Moreover, for 
each condition we ran a one-sampled T-test against the point of 
perfect synchrony (=0 ms).
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL DATA
Subjects performed the task with high accuracy. The timing 
(correct tone as well as valid action time) was correct in 96.92% 
(SD = 3.35%) of all trials. Button presses were correct in 99.15% 
of all trials (SD = 1.104%). In the ‘selection internal’ conditions 
subjects pressed the left button more often than the right button 
(53.4% compared to 46.6%; paired-samples T-test: t(13) = −3.066; 
p = 0.009). In the ‘timing internal’ conditions subjects pressed the 
buttons more often with the third tone than with the fourth tone 
(56.77% compared to 43.23%; paired-samples T-test: t(13) = 2.646; 
p = 0.020). Our subjects were thus slightly biased. This is in cor-
respondence with the common ﬁ  nding that people cannot generate 
sequences that are really random.
Subjects showed in all conditions a negative asynchrony, i.e., 
they performed the key press slightly in advance of the target tone 
[‘both internal’: −38.84 ms (SE 14.97); t(13) = −2.594; p = 0.022; 
‘timing internal’: −39.66 ms (SE 15.76); t(13) = −2.517; p = 0.026; 
‘selection internal’: −41.37 ms (SE 15.11); t(13) = −2.737; p = 0.017; 
‘both external’: −45.66 ms (SE 14.61); t(13) = −3.126; p = 0.008], 
a common ﬁ  nding in synchronization experiments (Aschersleben 
and Prinz, 1995). This shows that subjects did not simply react to 
the tones. However, there were no signiﬁ  cant differences in action 
times between the four conditions [F(3, 11) = 1.077; p = 0.399].
fMRI DATA
Whole-brain analysis
To analyze activity contingent on the cue and activity contingent 
on the target we computed two separate ANOVAs with the factors 
action selection (internal, external) and action timing (internal, 
external).
Cue-related activity. We found stronger activations for internal 
action selection than for external action selection in the right RCZ 
extending to medial BA 8 (Figure 2A) and in the right precuneus 
(BA 7) (Table 1). We did not ﬁ  nd any activation that was signiﬁ  -
cantly stronger for external action selection than for internal action 
selection.
Stronger activations for internal action timing than for external 
action timing were found in the left superior frontal gyrus (SFG) 
in BA 6 that extended from the medial wall to the lateral convexity 
of the SFG, hereinafter referred to as paramedian frontal cortex 
(Figure 3A; Table 1). Additionally we found activations that were 
stronger for external action timing than for internal action tim-
ing. These were located bilaterally at the border between inferior 
occipital lobe and fusiform gyrus (Table 1). Finally, the interaction 
of action timing and action selection did not yield any activation 
that survived the cluster threshold.
Target-related activity. Although our main focus was on activations 
appearing around the point in time when subjects made their deci-
sions (i.e., on cue-related activation) we also analyzed the processes 
taking place around the implementation of the decision. Stronger 
activations for internal action selection than for external action selec-
tion were found bilaterally in the middle frontal gyrus (BA 10), in the 
inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), as well as at the border between inferior 
frontal gyrus (BA 47) and the insula (BA 13) (see Table 2). The reverse 
comparison revealed no activation that survived the threshold. When 
computing the main effect for the when component, we found only 
an activation that was stronger for external action timing than for 
internal action timing. This was located in the lingual gyrus (BA 18). Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February  2009 | Volume  3 | Article  3 | 5
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FIGURE 2 | Main effect action selection (cue-related activity). (A) Whole-brain analysis. The contrast was averaged over 14 subjects (z-threshold at z = 3.09, 
corrected) and mapped to an individual brain from the in-house database. The comparison internal action selection > external action selection is shown. (B) Signal 
strength analysis. The diagram reports mean beta values for the RCZ coordinate (x = 6, y = 21, z = 36).
Table 1 | Anatomical location, hemisphere, maximum Z value (p = 0.001, corrected) and Talairach coordinates. Cue-related activations with a minimum 
cluster size of 1134 mm3 are shown.
Anatomical area  Side  Zmax Talairach  coordinates
     x y z
MAIN EFFECT ACTION SELECTION
Internal > external
  Rostral cingulate zone  R  4.26  6  21  36
 Precuneus  R  3.72  3  −60 45
MAIN EFFECT ACTION TIMING
Internal > external
  Superior frontal Gyrus (paramedian frontal cortex)  L  4.48  −18 12  51
External > internal
  Inferior occipital lobe/fusiform gyrus  L  4.95  −42  −66  −3
We observed no activations in the frontomedian wall, neither for the 
main effect action selection, nor for the main effect action timing. 
However, if we lowered the threshold to a more liberal one (z > 3.09; 
p = 0.05, corrected) we observed an activation in the RCZ for the 
main effect action selection. However, this activation was much 
smaller compared to the cue-related activation (567mm3 compared 
to 1944 mm3). As for the cue-related activation we did not ﬁ  nd any 
activation that survived the cluster threshold when computing the 
interaction term of action selection and action timing.
Signal strength analysis. To gain more detailed information about 
the pattern of activation of the cue-related activations that were 
linked to the two voluntary action components in the whole-brain 
analysis we performed a signal strength analysis in the two main Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February  2009 | Volume  3 | Article  3 | 6
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FIGURE 3 | Main effect action timing (cue-related activity). (A) Whole-brain 
analysis. The contrast was averaged over 14 subjects (z-threshold at z = 3.09, 
corrected) and mapped to an individual brain from the in-house database. The 
comparison internal action timing > external action timing is shown. (B) Signal 
strength analysis. The diagram reports mean beta values for the SFG coordinate 
(x = −18, y = 12, z = 51).
Table 2 | Anatomical location, hemisphere, maximum Z value (p = 0.001, corrected) and Talairach coordinates. Target-related activations with a 
minimum cluster size of 1134 mm3 are shown.
Anatomical area  Side  Zmax Talairach  coordinates
     x y  z
MAIN EFFECT ACTION SELECTION
Internal > external
  Middle frontal gyrus (BA 10)  R  4.17  30  51  21
  Middle frontal gyrus (BA 10)  L  3.93  −39 60  9
  Inferior frontal Gyrus/Insula (BA 47/13)  L  4.52  −45 18  −3
  Inferior parietal lobe (BA 40)  R  3.89  48  −36 51
  Inferior parietal lobe (BA 40)  L  5.28  −51  −42 48
MAIN EFFECT ACTION TIMING
External > internal
  Lingual gyrus (BA 18)  L  −4.90  −9  −72  −3
clusters for internal action selection (RCZ) and internal action 
timing (paramedian frontal cortex). A repeated measures ANOVA 
with factors action selection (internal vs. external) and action tim-
ing (internal vs. external) was computed for each region.
For the RCZ the results replicated the ﬁ  ndings of the whole-
brain analysis showing a signiﬁ  cant main effect for action selection 
(internal > external) [F(1, 13) = 15.456; p = 0.002] (see Figure 2B). 
The main effect action timing (internal  >  external) was not Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February  2009 | Volume  3 | Article  3 | 7
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 signiﬁ  cant [F(1, 13) = 3.77; p = 0.074]. For the paramedial  frontal 
cortex the results showed a signiﬁ  cant main effect action tim-
ing (internal > external) [F(1, 13) = 16.808; p = 0.001], while the 
main effect action selection was not signiﬁ  cant [F(1, 13) = 3.016; 
p  =  0.104]. Additionally there was a signiﬁ  cant interaction of 
action selection × action timing [F(1, 13) = 8.151; p = 0.014]. Only 
when the action selection was externally, internal action timing 
resulted in a stronger activation than external action timing (see 
Figure 3B).
However, it is important to note that the results of the signal 
strength analysis were obtained post hoc and are based on a much 
more liberal threshold than the whole-brain analysis and therefore 
should be interpreted with care.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to dissociate the ‘when-’ and the 
‘what-component’ of intentional action on the functional neuro-
anatomical level. In order to do so, participants were instructed to 
perform one of two possible actions at one of two possible points 
in time. We varied whether participants freely chose between the 
two actions and the two points in time, or whether action and 
point in time were indicated by a stimulus. In other words, ‘what’ 
and/or ‘when’ of the to-be-produced action (selection and timing) 
were based either on some internal decision or were speciﬁ  ed by 
an external stimulus.
We were primarily interested in activation differences underly-
ing the decisional aspects of voluntary action that is reﬂ  ected in the 
BOLD response contingent on the cue. The fact that we observed 
different activation maxima for internal action selection and inter-
nal action timing in decision relevant areas of the frontomedian 
wall stresses the fact that subjects really decided on the cue. The 
whole-brain analysis revealed two areas in the frontomedian wall 
that fulﬁ  ll different functions. The RCZ is involved in the internal 
selection of an action, whereas an area of the SFG in the left para-
median frontal cortex is involved in the decision ‘when’ to perform 
an action. However, the signal strength analysis revealed an interac-
tion of the action timing and action selection in the paramedian 
frontal cortex. When action selection was internally speciﬁ  ed the 
activation level was equally high for internal and external action 
timing. Only when action selection was externally speciﬁ  ed the 
activation level in the paramedian frontal cortex differed between 
internal and external action timing.
Notice that we found the strongest differential activations in 
the RCZ and paramedian frontal cortex in the analysis of the cue-
related signal and not in the analysis of the target-related signal, 
indicating that these activations reﬂ  ect processes preparing the 
upcoming action (viz. the internal speciﬁ  cation of the when and 
what action parameters) and not processes related to the execution 
of the action.
THE ROLE OF THE RCZ IN INTERNALLY SELECTED ACTIONS
The ﬁ  nding that the RCZ is primarily involved in internal action 
selection, but not in internal action timing conﬁ  rms the results from 
Mueller et al. (2007). These authors demonstrated increased RCZ 
activity for internally selected actions as compared to externally 
selected actions, while keeping the timing of the action constant. 
While involvement of the RCZ in internal action selection has also 
been found in several other studies (Cunnington et al., 2003, 2006; 
Deiber et al., 1999; Lau et al., 2004b; van Eimeren et al., 2006; Wiese 
et al., 2004, 2005) the present study is to our knowledge the ﬁ  rst that 
shows that this region is more sensitive for a selection manipulation 
than for a timing manipulation.
The functional role of the RCZ in voluntary action selection is 
still under discussion. Walton et al. (2004) argue that RCZ activity 
is related to the internal selection of an action and to assessing the 
consequences of the chosen action. This notion ﬁ  ts to the ideo-
motor principle of action control (Herwig et al., 2007; Hommel 
et al., 2001; James, 1890, 1950; Prinz, 1997; Waszak and Herwig, 
2007) that assumes that action representations are activated by 
anticipation of the actions’ effect, including body-related afferent 
information, that is, proprioceptive feedback (Hommel et al., 2001). 
The view of representing actions in terms of their action goals is 
widely spread (Jeannerod, 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 1997).
On the other hand it has been argued that the RCZ might be 
involved in conﬂ  ict monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001, 2004; Carter 
et al., 1998; Lau et al., 2004b, 2006) rather then in voluntary selec-
tion of action. Lau et al. (2006, 2004b) argue that, if a response 
has to be selected randomly from a set of possible responses, the 
response is underdetermined and, therefore, triggers response 
conﬂ  ict.
We believe that both interpretations are complimentary rather 
than contradictory. Selecting one response implies to reject all 
alternative responses. This idea is not new, but already expressed 
by James (1890, 1950) who said ‘The express ﬁ  at, or act of mental 
consent to the movement, comes in when the neutralization of 
the antagonistic and inhibitory idea is required’ (p. 526). The less 
the selection is predetermined, the more the alternative responses 
interfere with the selection and the more internal effort is required 
(Forstmann et al., 2006). This idea is in accordance with the sug-
gestion from Brass and Haggard (2008) that response conﬂ  ict is 
an inherent property of all action.
In addition to the hypothesized activation in the RCZ we found 
increased activation in the posterior precuneus that was related to 
internal action selection. The precuneus is extensively connected with 
the RCZ (Leichnetz, 2001; Petrides and Pandya, 1984). Furthermore 
there is evidence that the precuneus plays a role in voluntary action. 
In a recent neuroimaging study, Soon et al. (2008) found the ante-
rior precuneus – in addition to the frontopolar   cortex – to be a 
predictor of subjects’ free decisions ahead of time.
THE ROLE OF THE SUPERIOR FRONTAL GYRUS IN INTERNALLY 
TIMED ACTIONS
Activation in a part of the left SFG in the paramedian frontal cortex 
was found to be stronger for internally timed than for externally 
timed actions. This region is located slightly anterior and lateral 
to the preSMA. This is to our knowledge the ﬁ  rst evidence for an 
involvement of the SFG in the ‘when-component’ of intentional 
action. At ﬁ  rst sight this ﬁ  nding seems to be at odds with studies 
that indicated the preSMA to be involved in the decision when to 
act (Cunnington et al., 2002, 2003; Deiber et al., 1999; Jahanshahi 
et al., 1995; Jenkins et al., 2000; Wiese et al., 2004, 2005). However, 
in contrast to the present study, these studies did not disentan-
gle processes related to the decision when to act from processes 
related to the instantaneous initiation of the action and therefore Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  February  2009 | Volume  3 | Article  3 | 8
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 presumably confounded these two factors. Moreover, the activation 
we found is located very close to the preSMA. The existence of a 
functional link between paramedian frontal cortex and preSMA 
is thus probable.
The results from the signal strength analysis extend the results 
from the whole-brain analysis by showing an additional interac-
tion between selection and timing manipulation. Thus it seems 
that the paramedial frontal cortex is stronger activated for internal 
than for external action timing only if action selection is externally 
speciﬁ  ed. If action selection is internally speciﬁ  ed, paramedian 
frontal activation is almost the same for internal and external 
action timing.
Other structures that are considered to be involved in the timing 
of actions are the basal ganglia and the cerebellum (e.g., Elsinger 
et al., 2006; Jahanshahi et al., 2006; Taniwaki et al., 2003). We did 
not observe activation differences in these structures contingent 
on the cue, probably because they are not involved in the decision 
process (that takes place right after cue presentation), but only in 
the implementation of the action (that takes place during the target 
period). Furthermore we did not observe activation differences in 
the basal ganglia and cerebellum during the target period either, 
probably because at this processing stage both internally and exter-
nally timed actions draw equally on these structures.
DIFFERENTIATING WHAT- AND WHEN-COMPONENT 
OF INTENTIONAL ACTIONS
Our ﬁ  ndings suggest the existence of at least partially dissociable 
neural networks underlying the ‘what-’ and ‘when-component’ 
of intentional action: the RCZ and paramedian frontal cortex are 
differentially activated for intentional action selection and action 
timing, respectively. Nonetheless, the interaction between action 
timing and action selection within the paramedian frontal cortex 
revealed by the signal strength analysis indicates that decisional 
processes concerning action timing and selection are not com-
pletely dissociated. This ﬁ  nding is not surprising in the light of the 
functional interdependency of these two components of voluntary 
action control: For an action and its consequences to be evaluated 
both components have to be taken into account. This interdepend-
ency can be illustrated by looking at the example of the soccer 
player who has to decide whether to pass the ball or to shoot on 
the goal. His choice strongly depends on the moment when he 
intends to act. The optimal timing, in turn, depends largely on the 
action he chooses.
The nature of the interdependency between internal action selec-
tion and timing remains subject for future research. Deecke (1996) 
suggested a hierarchical organization with ‘what’ and ‘how’ decision 
preceding the ‘when-decision’. Although we have not investigated the 
sequential order in which the two decisions are taken, we consider 
our data to be in line with a superordinate role of the ‘what’-decision 
that is subsequently timed and integrated into an action plan.
ACTIVATIONS RELATED TO THE TARGET
Although the present study focused mainly on decisional processes 
of voluntary action control taking place contingent on the pres-
entation of the cue, activations related to the target tone should 
be considered brieﬂ  y.
The activations found for the main effect action selection are 
similar to those found in prospective memory tasks such as the 
middle frontal gyrus (BA 10) and the inferior parietal lobe (BA 40) 
(c.f. Simons et al., 2006). In event-based prospective memory 
the intended action has to be remembered until the intention is 
retrieved upon presentation of the triggering stimulus condition 
(c.f. Einstein et al., 1992). Evidently, in our task subjects have to 
remember the selected action parameters until execution. Our 
results seem to indicate that the retrieval of internally generated 
action intentions draws especially heavily on the prospective 
memory network. This may be due to the quality of a represen-
tation speciﬁ  ed by some distinct external stimulus being better 
than the quality of an internally generated representation. That 
this effect was observed for internally selected actions only and 
not for internally timed actions may be due the fact that, con-
cerning the timing component of our task, the to-be-retrieved 
action parameter (which tone) and ‘retrieval cue’ (target tone) 
are basically identical.
Most important in the present context is the absence of target-
related activation differences within the frontomedian wall. Only 
when the threshold was lowered we could observe activation in the 
RCZ for the main effect action selection. However, compared to the 
cue-related activation this activation has a much smaller extend. 
Given the above mentioned stronger involvement of prospective 
memory in the implementation of internal action selection the 
activation in the RCZ might reﬂ  ect processes related to the updating 
of the decision. This ﬁ  nding conﬁ  rms the notion that activation 
differences in the frontomedian wall reﬂ  ect primarily decisional 
aspects of voluntary action control, rather than processes related 
to the implementation of the action.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of the present study was to experimentally differentiate 
between different components of intentional action. Our experi-
ment shows that the intentional decision when to execute an action 
is associated with activation in a part of the SFG, the parame-
dian frontal cortex, while the intentional decision which action to 
execute activates the RCZ.
Thus, we were able to dissociate the processes underlying ‘what’ 
and ‘when’ based voluntary decision processes. This challenges the 
idea of a unitary system supporting voluntary action. Instead, we 
propose that voluntary action control is an interplay of different 
neuroanatomically dissociable subfunctions. It is conceivable that 
in addition to the when- and what-component of intentional action 
other components might be dissociable as well (Brass and Haggard, 
2007, 2008). Such a functional segregation of intentional action will 
certainly help to understand the confusing pattern of empirical 
ﬁ  ndings. Furthermore, it is consistent with philosophical concep-
tions of intentions related to action which also distinguish different 
levels of action-related intentions.
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